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Abstract: 
Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) has traditionally been 
attracted to countries with high political risks – a worrying trend as this exposes the 
investments to additional risks such as economic default on loans and ensuing 
socioeconomic instability (Drezner 2019). In the context of the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), this is of significant concern because of the large amounts of Chinese FDI that flow 
through the BRI. 
Yet what do we actually know about political risk considerations in Chinese 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) with respect to the Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI)?  
Over the years, academic research has tried to understand the determinants of 
Chinese Outward Investments - a key instrument in the economic rise of China (Du & 
Zhang, 2018). Early data on Chinese foreign investment behavior prior to the initiation of 
v 
vi 
the BRI suggests that Chinese firms were highly acceptant of political risks compared to 
non-Chinese firms (Buckley 2007; Kolstad and Wiig 2012). Chinese firms invested heavily 
in countries at significant risk of political and economic instability, largely due to the moral 
hazards stemming from soft budget constraints affecting the state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in China’s command economy (Kornai 1980; Li and Liang 1998). Does this trend 
hold today in regard to Chinese firms’ investment behavior in the context of the major 
expansion in Chinese OFDI under the Belt and Road Initiative? What is the empirical 
evidence to support or challenge the assertions that the Belt and Road Initiative will 
incentivize Chinese ODFI to behave more like non-Chinese standard firms? 
In this report, I examine the empirical claims regarding Chinese OFDI political risk 
behavior.  Using the ICRG Political Risk Index and the Chinese Global Investment Tracker 
for the period 2005 - 2017, I run a panel data regression to investigate how host country 
political risk affects the flows of Chinese OFDI. The results of the statistical analysis, when 
analyzed through existing theoretical frameworks, indicate that Chinese OFDI is far less 
political risk acceptance than previously thought. This suggests that prevailing concerns 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
Host country political risk is a key determinant in the Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) decisions of a multinational firm (Busse and Hefeker 2007). The conventional 
understanding of the relationship between Foreign Direct Investment and Host Country 
political risks argues that market oriented firms located in more capitalist-oriented 
countries tend to invest in host countries with lower political risks (Chakrabarti 2001). This 
behavior of the firms can be explained by the Internalization Theory (Coase (1937); 
Buckley and Casson (1976); and Rugman (1985)) and the O – Ownership, L – Location, I 
– Internalization (OLI) Theory (Buckley P. 1988).  These theories collectively argue that 
firms will invest in locations that minimize costs and risks, including dangers of political 
and economic instability or expropriation. Firms will also invest where they enjoy a 
comparative or competitive advantage over other firms investing in that foreign market 
(Ricardo 1817; Buckley and Casson 1981).  
However, the risk perception of a state owned firm (also known as State-Owned 
Enterprise, or SOE) is different from that of a privately-owned firm. SOEs are less deterred 
by risky environments (Cui and Jiang (2012); and Knutsen, Rygh, and Hveem (2011)). 
This behavioral difference can be understood by the Soft Budget Constraint (SBC) 
Syndrome (Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003); Kornai (1980)). The SBC syndrome can 
be found in organizations that have a soft budget constraint (i.e. they are bailed out by a 
supporting organization, often the government, if they make a loss). This creates a moral 
hazard problem, wherein SOEs tend to take on more risks when investing in foreign 
countries, as they can transfer the risk to the supporting organization (Dewatripont and 
Maskin (1995); Li and Liang (1998); and Lin and Tan (1999)).  
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Existing empirical evidence, most focusing on data preceding the BRI (that is, 
before 2013), reveals that Chinese OFDI, driven by the Chinese SOEs, does indeed flow 
into countries with higher political risks (Buckley, et al. 2007). As Chinese OFDI has 
grown over the past decades, the global implications of risky investment behavior have 
attracted considerable attention.  
The Belt and Road Initiative, announced by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 
September of 2013, is an ambitious infrastructure project - a network of rail, roadways and 
energy pipelines that would span over Asia and Europe (Chatzky & McBride, 2019).  Xi 
envisioned this bold initiative, named the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as the means to 
drive economic development in Asia and Europe, through the funding of large-scale 
infrastructure and development projects. This was a welcome move considering the 
funding gap (nearly $26 trillion as estimated by the Asian Development Bank), for the 
infrastructure development projects in Asia required by 2030 (Rolland 2019). 
The tendency to accept higher risks was particularly concerning with the launch of 
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), due to the sheer amount of investments pledged -- nearly 
$8 trillion (Balding (2017); and Hillman (2018)). Many anticipated dangerous debt 
implications of the BRI on the host countries, most of which are developing economies and 
fragile or failing states. (Heydarian (2018); and Hurley, Morris, and Portelence (2019)). 
Observers feared that infeasible and risky projects undertaken by Chinese SOEs could 
saddle host countries with unsustainable loans or loan conditions that would undermine 
long term political and socioeconomic stability (Hurley, Morris, and Portelence (2019); 
and Dave and Kobayashi (2018); and Johnston (2019)). 
Chinese actions in the early days of the BRI did little to mitigate concerns that 
China’s investment would contribute to risk in host countries. In Ecuador, China invested 
in the Coca Codo Sinclair dam in the period between 2011 and 2016 to the tune of $1.7 
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billion, largely ignoring feasibility studies as well as environmental concerns (Casey & 
Krauss, 2018). During this time, Ecuador was going through a period of financial and 
political instability, with the country expected to slide into recession. The left-wing 
populist President, Mr. Correa had rejected western institutions and defaulted on a $3.2 
billion foreign debt. With no other options left at his disposal, President Correa turned to 
China. The investment came in the form of a loan, most of which came from the Chinese 
Export-Import Bank, that charged a high interest rate and mandated the use of Chinese 
companies in construction. Effectively, this denied Ecuador companies from any economic 
benefit arising from the project. The result was that not only did the dam not generate 
electricity, as intended; the interests on the dam alone costs Ecuador $125 million in a year 
(Casey & Krauss, 2018). However, none of this posed any risk to Chinese investments, 
since according to the terms China will be repaid in oil if Ecuador defaults. So, as part of  
the FDI agreement, Ecuador was required to hand over 80 percent of its produced oil to 
China in order to pay back the debt on the Coca Codo Sinclair dam (Wang, 2019).  
Likewise, in Sri Lanka, China invested heavily in the Hambantota port  in 2010. 
Again, most of the loan came from China’s Export – Import Bank, starting with $307 
million (Abi-Habib 2018). Sri Lanka had just come out of a long civil war. President 
Rajapaksa, finding his country isolated due to human rights accusations, relied on China 
for economic and military support. Amidst allegations of bribing officials and taking 
advantage of the political turmoil in the country, China invested in the Hambantota port. 
This was despite studies stating that the port would be economically infeasible. These 
studied were later proven correct by unusually low numbers of shipping through the port, 
including a measly 34 ships in 2012 (Betigeri, 2018).  Consequently, the debt on the Sri 
Lankan port ballooned to more than one billion USD. Abi-Habib (2018) writes that, while  
the terms on the loans were reasonable, including variable interest rate of 1 percent in the  
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beginning, it was around the time the BRI was announced that Chinese government refused  
any extensions on the repayment and increased the interest to around 6.3 percent.  When 
the Sri Lankan government was unable to service its debt, Chinese government forced the 
Sri Lankan government to hand over the port and the surrounding area to the Chinese Navy 
for 99 years. This gave the Chinese Navy a valuable port in the Indian Ocean. 
Concerns remain over the feasibility of a multitude of projects undertaken by 
Chinese (SOEs) companies under the BRI, primarily because a significant number of these 
investments are in countries that are prone to political volatility. Countries such as Somalia, 
Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq – all of them part of the BRI, continue to witness political 
turmoil and are ranked as the most fragile countries according to the Fragile States Index 
(Zhang & Xiao, 2017). Even countries that were politically stable at the time of the 
inception of BRI, such as Turkey, and Ethiopia, have seen a decline in their political 
stability. 
However, my study finds that the BRI may have tapered, on average, the risk 
acceptant tendency of Chinese firms. My analysis shows that while Chinese firms may still 
be more risk acceptant than market oriented firms, there is actually a negative correlation 
between Chinese OFDI and host country political risk post BRI. This means that Chinese 
foreign investments post BRI flowed into countries with lower political risks compared to 
pre-BRI. While this does not necessarily prove a change in the preference of Chinese firms, 
my findings throw light on the puzzling relationship between Chinese OFDI and political 
risks, suggesting that the BRI may not be exacerbating any of the underlying moral hazard 
or soft budget constraints traditionally associated with Chinese SOEs and highlighting the 
need for further research into this topic. 
Chunlai (2018) argues that we must correctly understand the nature of Chinese 
investments with respect to countering China’s rising geo-strategic influence, which is 
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driven by its growing FDI.  Yet what do we know empirically about Chinese ODFI today? 
This paper questions  the conventional  understanding of the Chinese investment preference 
vis-à-vis political risk. Previous studies, such as Buckley (2007) and Kolstad & Wiig 
(2012), focus their research on years prior to 2013 - a landmark year for Chinese OFDI. 
The empirical study offered here in this report is, to my knowledge, first of its kind to 
analyze the relationship between Chinese Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) and 
political risk in the period after the announcement of BRI, from 2013-2017. 
This report is structured as follows: First, in the following section I review the 
theoretical framework necessary to understand Chinese OFDI and political risk. In Chapter 
3, I examine existing literature on Chinese OFDI and Political Risk and present my null 
and counter-hypothesis. Chapter 4 lays down the datasets that will inform my study. In 
Chapter 5, I examine the data on recent Chinese OFDI. In Chapter 6, I visualize the average 
risks associated with Chinese foreign investments, and check for any trends in the average 
risk of Chinese investments vis-à-vis average global political risk. Chapter 7 and 8 present 
the empirical model and the results of the statistical analysis. In Chapter 9, I discuss the 
significance of the results and the insights they reveal about the investment pattern of 
Chinese firms. I offer my conclusions in Chapter 10, focusing on the evolution of the 
relationship between Chinese OFDI and political risk. I lay out the possible explanations 
for the change in the relationship between Chinese OFDI and political risk observed in my 
empirical analysis. This study opens up avenues for future research that might add to the 
existing knowledge about the behavior of Chinese firms.  
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Chapter 2:  Theory 
The political risk considerations of a state-owned firm’s FDI decisions can be 
understood from the theoretical framework of Internalization and O - Ownership, L - 
Location, and I – Internalization (OLI) Theory, and the SBC theory. This Chapter reviews 
these theories and the concepts that are required to understand the political risks associated 
Chinese OFDI. 
POLITICAL RISKS  
Political risks are the risks faced by a foreign firm owing to the imperfections of 
the host country’s government or judicial actions or institutions. Political risks adversely 
affect the value of the firm’s investment in that country (Bekaert, Campbell, Lundblad, & 
Stephen, 2014). For example, political instability, concluding in a change of regime may 
result in a drastic change in the government policies with respect to foreign investment, 
and in extreme cases, may even result in host government expropriation. This is what 
happened in Cuba after Fidel Castro came to power in 1959. The Castro led Cuban 
government ordered an expropriation, covering utilities, oil, and sugar. The newly formed 
Cuban government seized most of the private property, a sizeable chunk of which was 
investments by American firms. Valued at $750 million – it accounted for two-thirds of 
the total US investment in Cuba (Johnson 1964). 
Political risks include aspects such as government stability, strength of the legal 
system, and external or internal conflict (Howell and Chaddick 1994). Political risks can 
be quantified and estimated by political risk indices. There are many institutions that offer  
political risk indices for countries, the most well-known of which are indices are by The 
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Economist1, the Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI) Political Risk Index 
(PRI)2, and the Political Risk index by the Political Risk Service (PRS)3. 
The political risk index formulated by The Economist weighs six political variables: 
neighbor countries, authoritarianism, smooth transition of government, illegitimacy of the 
government, armed insurrections, and generals in power; and four social variables: 
urbanization pace, Islamic fundamentalism, ethnic tension, and corruption to calculate a 
political risk score for each country (Howell 1992). Similarly, the BERI PRI uses social 
and political variables, covering internal causes, such as fractionalization of the political 
spectrum, ethnic/ religious divisions and external variables comprising of regional political 
forces, and dependence of external power. Regional Experts score the countries on these 
variables, which are then summed to get the final political risk index (Howell and 
Chadwick 1994). 
The Political Risk Index formulated by the PRS evaluates countries over twelve 
variables ranging from government stability to bureaucratic quality (Howell 1986). I 
expound upon the PRS index and its variables in detail in the Data section, as I use it for 
my statistical analysis. Howell and Chadwick (1984), when comparing the above-
mentioned three indices, found the PRS Risk index to be the most reliable. 
INTERNALIZATION THEORY AND THE OLI THEORY 
 As explained by (Buckley 1988), "internalization theory rests on two main axioms 
1) Firms choose the least cost location for each activity they perform, and 2) firms grow 






outweighed by costs.” There is significant literature on internalization, from (Coase 1937) 
to (Buckley and Casson 1976) and (Rugman 1985). 
Dunning (1980) built upon the Internalization theory (Buckley 1988) and proposed 
the eclectic (OLI) paradigm of production financed by FDI. Applying the OLI framework 
According to the eclectic paradigm, a firm will invest in international production if: 
a)  O (Ownership Advantage) - Firms have a competitive edge over other 
nationality’s firms in serving a particular market. These are ‘ownership advantages’ that 
are considered exclusive to the firm, at least for a period of time. 
b)  L (Location Advantage) - In addition to the previous conditions, the firm should 
have some advantages in producing outside its home countries; otherwise, the foreign 
market could be served by exports. 
c)  I (Internalization Advantage) - It is advantageous for the firm to internalize the 
markets and add value by doing so. 
The Internalization and OLI theories give us an insight into why firms may choose 
to invest in foreign countries. It is understood from the L condition of OLI that a firm will 
invest in a foreign market if the benefits of doing so outweigh the costs of moving into that 
market. Political instability in the host country, that threatens to disrupt business 
operations, will be an added cost to firms when they consider their decision to invest in a 
foreign market. The higher the added cost of political risk in a country, the higher the 
advantages need to be for any firm to make an investment in that country, or else, the firm 
will choose not to invest. Thus, we should observe a positive relationship between FDI and 
the political risk of the host country.  
Political risk is a key component when firms consider their investment decisions 
(Busse and Hefeker 2007). Firms are more likely to invest in countries that have low levels 
of internal conflict and corruption, efficient bureaucracy, and a robust governance – 
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indicators of low political risk (Hayakawa, Kimura, and Lee 2013; Goswami and Haider 
2014). This observation – positive correlation between host country political risk and FDI, 
holds true even for developing countries, where the political risks are relatively higher, 
there is a positive correlation FDI flows (Krifa-Schneider and Matei 2010). 
SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINT 
While market-oriented firms may shy away from exposing their investments to high 
political risks, State-Owned Enterprises have a higher risk tolerance (Cull and Xu 2000). 
This behavior of the State Owned Enterprises can be explained by the Soft Budget 
Condition Syndrome (Kornai, Maskin, and Roland 2003). Kornai (1980) first observed this 
behavior in the Hungarian SOEs in the 1970s, wherein the loss-making firms were not 
allowed to fail by the government (Kornai J. 1980). The SBC Syndrome involves a pair of 
organizations – a BC organization, that faces a budget constraint, and the S organization, 
which supports the BC organization. 
A Soft Budget Constraint Syndrome is when a firm can count on another 
organization to intervene in case of a budget deficit (Kornai, Maskin, and Roland 2003). 
The intervening organization is usually another government agency or, in some cases, the 
government itself. Hence, firms are not penalized if they make any losses. This leads to a 
distortion in the motivation of the firms, as they now seek to gain favor of the organizations 
that may potentially rescue them (Krueger 1998). The rescue comes in the form of fiscal  
means, credits, or some indirect method. The first type of intervention is fiscal means, 
which include tax subsidies granted to the BC (Budget Constraint) organization in distress. 
The second mode – credit softening, involves the extension of credit to the distressed BC 
organization. The third type of intervention is an indirect method – such as the imposition 
of tariffs, that may rescue a firm in financial hardship (Bonin, Schaffer, and Banks 1995). 
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While even market firms may exhibit the SBC syndrome under certain conditions, such as 
when the failure of the market firms threatens the collapse of the entire financial system 
(Sorkin, 2010), this syndrome is a characteristic feature of State Owned Enterprises 
(Dewatripont and Maskin 1995; and Schaffer 1998). Several empirical studies have 
confirmed the SBC theory by studying the behavior of the SOEs (Li and Liang 1998; Lin 
and Tan 1999). 
The prevalence of the SBC syndrome among SOEs can be understood by looking 
at the causes of the SBC syndrome. That will help us understand why SOEs are particularly 
susceptible to the syndrome. The first theoretical explanation, given by Shleifer and Vishny 
(1994) attributes SBC syndrome to the intervention of politicians in firms. In case of SOEs, 
politicians have direct control over the firm. Hence, a politician’s influence on the firm will 
adversely affect the profitability of the firm. However, a politician would not want the firm 
to go out of business as the resulting unemployment may create undesired political 
repercussions. Thus, the politician, will subsidize the firms for losses, softening the budget 
constraint for the SOE (Shleifer and Vishny 1994; Li and Liang 1998). The second 
explanation for the SBC syndrome is provided by Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003), 
attributing the syndrome to bureaucratic paternalism, where the state might feel responsible 
for the performance of the SOE. There is an added pressure on the leaders to prevent a 
financial failure of the firm, as any such failure would reflect negatively on the leader (Bai 
and Wang 1996). 
SOES AND FDI – DIFFERENCE BETWEEN STATE OWNED FIRM AND MARKET FIRM 
A state owned firm is less productive than a privately owned when investing in 
foreign markets (Boardman and Aidan 1989). This decline in productivity can be attributed 
to three factors. Firstly, SOEs are likely to have non-economic goals, thus a firms FDI 
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decision may not always be motivated by profit maximization. Often, other factors such as 
– the government’s foreign policy, affects the location choice for a SOE’s FDI 
(Anastassopoulos, Blanc, and Dussauge 1987). Secondly, the SOEs have weaker owner 
control, which may result in opportunistic behavior when engaging in FDI and are not 
sensitive to risks (Chen, Firth, and Xu 2009). Thirdly, SOE’s links with the home 
government can affect how the firm conducts operation in a foreign market. The SOE’s 
relationship with the home government may either bestow ownership advantages – through 
friendly relations with the host country government or saddle the firm with disadvantages, 
like excessive bureaucratic processes for project approval  (Knutsen, Rygh, and Hveem 
2011). 
The three factors explaining the difference in behavior of a state owned firm can be 
explained by the OLI and the SBC theory. The first and second points explaining the 
characteristic behavior of SOEs can be understood through the theoretical framework of 
the Soft Budget Constraint. Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003) specifically lay down this 
behavioral change in the firms due to the SBC syndrome, and state that firms suffering 
from the syndrome will “rather than wooing customers, concentrate more on winning the 
favor of potential S-organizations”. This behavioral effect of the SBC syndrome was also 
observed by Kreuger (1998). This explains why a state-owned enterprise, that relies on the 
government for its survival, would factor in the home country’s foreign policy decisions in 
its FDI decision. Additionally, political influence will change the objective of the state-
owned firm (Shleifer and Vishny 1994). 
The reduced risk sensitivity of the firm is another behavioral effect of the SBC 
syndrome (Cui and Jiang 2012). This is tied to the moral hazard problem arising due to soft 
budget constraints. This can be understood by looking at how a state-owned firm might 
view a risky business environment differently as compared to the risk perception of a 
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market oriented private firm.  A firm might have to face an unfavorable outcome when 
investing in a risky environment. However, in such an eventuality, a state-owned firm, due 
to its soft budget constraints, can count on the home government to bail it out, thus 
transferring the risk to the home government. This results in a moral hazard problem where 
the SOEs might be less deterred by the risks in foreign environment, knowing that their 
government will help them if they get into any financial trouble. On the contrary, a market-
oriented firm, with a hard budget constraint, enjoys no such favors from the government 
or any other agency, and hence, will be more sensitive to risks. Additionally, a state owned 
firm may be less likely to face expropriation because it would pose a significant political 
risk to the host country government (Kobrin 1980). This adds to the moral hazard problem 
of state-owned firms investing in countries where the political risks are high. 
The third factor, ties with the home country government, explains why a state 
owned firm might behave differently than a privately owned firm. This can be understood 
via the theoretical framework of the OLI, specifically, the Ownership advantage. The 
Ownership advantage states that a firm will invest in a foreign market if it has a competitive 
advantage over other firms serving in that particular market (Dunning 2001). A state-
owned firm, owing to its closeness to the home country government may rely on the 
government for support when investing in foreign markets. The home country government 
may intervene on behalf of the state-owned firm when dealing with the host country 
government, and in some cases, may even sign bilateral or regional agreements to help 
those state-owned firms (Luo, Xue, and Han 2010). This type of government support 
provides an ownership advantage to the state-owned firm over other firms when they invest 
in foreign markets. The direct government intervention also insulates a firm from the 
political risks, which adds to the ownership advantages of the state-owned firms. 
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EVIDENCE OF SOFT BUDGET CONSTRAINTS SYNDROME IN CHINESE SOES 
Chinese SOEs often have soft budget constraints owing to their state ownerships. 
This can be attributed to: 1) the organizational structure within which Chinese SOEs 
operate, and 2) the banking structure in China. 
Organizational Structure 
There are multiple evidences that point to the existence of soft budget constraints 
in Chinese SOEs due to their structure. The primary evidence is the strategy of growth 
adopted by Chinese firms. The pre-reform (before 1978) era was defined by extensive 
government control of firms (Davies 1995; Child and Lu 1996). In the post-reform era, 
although managers enjoyed more autonomy, and the firms were made more accountable  
(Zhang and Yu 1994); the structure and the network remained similar to the pre-reform era 
(Peng and Harwit 1996). The Chinese SOEs adopted a network-based strategy of growth 
and development of interorganizational relationships, which blurred the boundaries 
between organizations and made organizations more interdependent (Powell 1990). 
Additionally, Chinese SOEs enjoy financial backing of the local and central government  
(Walder 1995). Chinese SOEs are also institutionally safer. The central government assures 
the Chinese SOEs that they will be bailed out if and when they are in financial trouble (Ma 
H. 1991). This gives rise to the SBC syndrome in Chinese SOEs as the government will 
not let the SOEs fail. 
An analysis of the performance of Chinese SOEs also reveals the existence of SBC 
syndrome. There is a negative relationship between firm performance and state ownership 
among the Chinese SOEs (Sun and Tong 2003; Wei, Xie, and Zhang 2005). The rate of 
return of Chinese SOEs was consistently below industrial average (Li and Liang 1998). In 
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addition, Chinese SOEs suffer from viability issues emanating out of price distortions – a 
need to keep the price of essential items low, which is another cause for the SBC syndrome 
(Lin and Tan 1999).  
Role of the Chinese State Banking System 
China’s state owned banks dominate China’s financial system (Allen, Qian, and 
Qian 2005). Some of the largest banks in China, also known as “the big four” – Bank of 
China (BOC), The Construction Bank of China (CBC), the Agricultural Bank of China 
(ABC), and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) are state owned 
(Megginson 2014). The principal means by which the Chinese government supports the 
SOEs is through the state owned banks and financial institutions (Wei and Wang, 1997; 
Lardy, 1998). The dominance of Chinese state owned banks and the scale of the support 
they provide to state owned enterprises indicates the prevalence of soft budget constraints. 
Chinese state owned banks grant preferential treatment to the Chinese SOEs, 
especially when they are in distress (Cull and Xu 2000), which results in the state owned 
firms becoming heavily dependent on the state owned banks and reliant on bailouts when 
they suffer a financial loss. This softening of budget constraints by credit means, is a 




Chapter 3:  Chinese OFDI and Political Risk  
Analysts, Gerstel (2018), Smith (2018), Ratner (2018), Raiser and Ruta (2019) for 
instance, repeatedly refer to the risks, including political, associated with the Chinese 
investments for projects within the Belt and Road Initiative. However, even Chinese 
companies are concerned about the political risks, including protests and political volatility, 
that they face in foreign markets (Shi 2017). A considerable number of the BRI countries 
such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Syria, suffer from civil unrest, political instability, and 
even armed conflict. These risks are compounded since Chinese firms facing these risks 
may not get adequate legal protection owing to the weak legal institutions in these BRI 
countries (McKenzie 2017). Managers of Chinese firms have expressed concern that the 
Belt and Road Initiative has over-exposed Chinese firms to the above mentioned risks (Shi 
2017). An analysis of the risk for a few projects, especially in politically unstable countries, 
reinforces this concern (Hillman (2018); Greet (2018); and Standish (2019)). What is the 
nature of these political risks, and how do such risks factor into the decisions driving 
Chinese OFDI? 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CHINESE OFDI AND POLITICAL RISK 
Ever since Chinese companies started “going out” (investing in foreign markets), 
there has been an interest in the determinants of Chinese Foreign Direct Investments. 
Existing scholarship examining the relationship between OFDI and political risk suggests 
a negative relationship between the two (countries with lower political risk attract more 
FDI) (Busse and Hefeker (2006); and Goswami and Haider (2014)). However, with respect 
to China, FDI researchers observed that Chinese OFDI tended more towards countries with 
weaker institutions and relative political instability. Such studies have been carried out over 
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different time periods, mostly using firm-level analysis. For example, Buckley, et al. (2007) 
analyze the determinants of Chinese investments for the years between 1984 and 2001. 
Their analysis finds a positive relationship between Chinese ODI and host country political 
risk. Their study used the ICRG risk index as a proxy for country political risk. Their study 
found that for every 1% increase in the host country risk index, there was a 1.8% decrease 
in Chinese ODI to that country (i.e., higher index implies lower political risk). Yeung and 
Liu (2008) study the behavior of Chinese OFDI over the period 2002 – 2008 and analyze 
the risk associated with Chinese ventures. They confirm the tendency of Chinese firms to 
take on excessive risks relative to non-Chinese firms. Employing a slightly different 
statistical model, Kolstad and Wiig (2012) observed a similar relationship between Chinese 
OFDI and host country institutions for the period 2003-2006. The authors observed that 
Chinese OFDI was directed towards countries with weaker institutions. They use the 
strength of institutions (rule of law index4) from the World Bank Institute (WBI) 
Governance Indicators as an indicator of the political risk in that country, wherein weaker 
institutions translate to higher risks. This unusual correlation is confirmed by other works 
as well (see, e.g., Liu, Chen, and Wu (2018); Blonigen (2005); and Chang (2014)). 
Researchers attribute this unconventional relationship between Chinese OFDI and 
political risk to the nature of Chinese firms (Morck, Yeung, & Zhao, 2008). They observe 
that Chinese firms are different from standard firms in their maximizing objective. Kolstad 
and Wiig (2012) deduce that this is particularly true with respect to Chinese OFDI in host 
countries with natural resources. They find that Chinese OFDI “flows into countries with 
poor institutions and large natural resources”. According to Buckley (2007), a Chinese 




and a large portion of their investments in riskier countries may be due to the Chinese 
government’s influence. He suggests that the Chinese firms’ decision to invest in a country 
may have been influenced by the political connection between China and the host country.  
It should be noted that Cheung and Qian (2009) do not find the quality of 
institutions (the proxy for country political risk used by other scholars) to be statistically 
significant in determining Chinese OFDI. At the same time, I was unable to find any studies 
that found a negative statistical correlation between Chinese OFDI and host country 
political risk.  Thus, we can conclude that the existing literature suggests either a positive 
correlation or,  possibly, no significant correlation. Hence, my null hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H0 : The correlation between Chinese OFDI and home country political risk 
continues to remain positive after 2013 (the year BRI was launched). 
 
However, the existing literature focuses on the years prior to the Belt and Road 
Initiative and thereby, does not account for any changes in investment patterns due to BRI. 
Scissors (2016), studying Chinese OFDI, speculated that the investment pattern itself has 
undergone a tremendous change. This warrants a review of the existing knowledge about 
the role of host country political risk as a determinant of Chinese FDI flow to that country. 
Hence, my counter hypothesis is: 
 
Ha : The correlation between Chinese OFDI and home country political risk 
becomes negative after 2013 (the year BRI was launched). 
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Chapter 4: Data 
I use the following datasets to study Chinese OFDI and political risks. I collect data 
for the period between 2005 and 2017. I choose the starting year as 2005, as that was the 
year when Chinese foreign investments gained worldwide attention with Lenovo, China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and Haier attempting to take over IBM, 
Unocal, and, Maytag (three prominent US firms), respectively (He and Lyles 2008). I limit 
my analysis until 2017, as I want to study the Chinese investment pattern independent of 
any external pressures. The US imposed sanctions on China in 2018 (Ching and Li (2018); 
Liu and Woo (2018); and Haas, Jacobs and Helmore (2018)). Any change in Chinese 
investment after that will reflect the external US pressure and bias my study.  
Chinese Global Investment Tracker (CGIT) Dataset: 
The CGIT5 dataset is provided by the American Institute Enterprise. It 
comprehensively covers China’s global investment, aggregating firm investments to 
calculate the total Chinese OFDI in a country. CGIT includes transactions across multiple 
sectors like energy, transportation, property, and other industries (Scissors, China Global 
Investment Tracker). The analysis in this paper uses data for the years between 2005 and 
2017. 
Political Risk Index (ICRG) Ratings: 
The ICRG Political Risk Index, constructed by the Political Risk Service group 
assesses the political stability of countries on a comparable basis. The methodology assigns 




increasing scale, 0 being the minimum points that can be assigned to a component. The 
maximum number of points that can be assigned varies depending upon the weight 
associated with a component. Higher points indicate a better score. The twelve components 
and their descriptions are Government Stability (12 points), Socio-Economic (12 points), 
Investment profile (12 points), Internal Conflict (12 points), External Conflict (12 points), 
Corruption Index (6 points), Military in Politics (6 points), Religious Tensions (6 points), 
Law and Order (6 points), Ethnic tensions (6 points), Democratic Accountability (6 points), 
and Bureaucratic Quality (4 points). (Howell, "International country risk guide 
methodology"). A detailed description of the components is attached in the appendix.  
I compute the total risk index by summing the values for each individual index. 
Adding ICRG components to create a new variable is consistent with the methodology 
used by Wellhausen (2015); and Allee (2011). It should be noted that all the indices are 
scores, with higher scores corresponding to lower risks. Henceforth in this paper, a higher 





Chapter 5:  Winds of Change: Changing Pattern of Chinese Investment 
In order to find evidence for my counter-hypothesis, I study if there is a change in 
the pattern of Chinese OFDI. Chinese foreign direct investment has been increasing 
steadily over the last decade, with a growth spurt in 2013 after the announcement of BRI. 
In 2017, China's outbound investment exceeded 100 billion USD, making China the 
world's second-largest overseas investor. Du and Zhang (2017) claim this event as a 
"historical transformation of the role of Chinese companies from global manufacturers to 
global investors." They observe that Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are the 
primary investors under BRI, mainly because these SOEs have developed extensive 
expertise in infrastructure activities within China.  
The growth in investment is not perfectly linear, wherein Chinese companies 
continue to invest in the same industries that they invested in for decades. Instead, there is 
a change in the distribution of FDI across sectors and countries. A preliminary analysis of 
the sector-wise and geographic distribution of investments hints at a deeper shift in the 
investment pattern. 
SECTOR WISE ANALYSIS 
In this section, I look at the sector-wise distribution of Chinese investments in the 
period 2005 – 2017.  Any change in the investment pattern will be reflected in the change 
in the distribution of Chinese investments across different sectors. The investments, spread 
across 12 major sectors: Agriculture, Chemicals, Energy, Entertainment, Finance, Health, 
Logistics, Metals, Real Estate, Technology, Tourism, Transport, and Utilities, give us 
interesting insights regarding the evolving pattern of Chinese investments.  
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A longitudinal analysis of Chinese investments for the period 2005-2017 clearly 
shows the growth of investments across every sector. The growth, however, is not uniform 
across all sectors, which reveals a change in investment pattern. In some sectors, such as 
Metals, there is no net growth at all, with the investments rising initially but then falling 
sharply back to the initial 2005 level. 
The sectors can be broadly characterized into three categories based upon the 
magnitude of growth of Chinese investments in absolute dollar value. Sectors that show a 
clear upward trend include Energy, Real Estate, Transport, and Utilities (Fig 1). Then there 
are sectors such as Technology, Utilities and Entertainment, where there is an observable 
but moderate growth in investment, with a spike in 2016 (Fig 2). Finally, the Metals sector 
shows no net growth in investment in the period 2005-2017 (Fig 3).  
 
 
Figure 1: Chinese OFDI in Energy, Real Estate, and Transport Sectors from 2005 to 2017 
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Figure 2: Chinese OFDI in Entertainment, Technology, and Utilities Sectors from 2005 to 
2017 
 
Figure 3: Chinese OFDI in Metals Sector from 2005 to 2017 
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A Cross-Sectional analysis reveals the extent of the change in investment patterns. 
Investments in the Metals sector, as a percentage of the total Chinese investments in a year, 
dropped from 17.2% in 2005 to 2.5% in 2017. Even sectors that experienced growth in 
absolute terms, such as the energy sector, show a decline in its share of investment relative 
to the total investment. The only sectors registering a significant growth are the agriculture 
sector (increasing from 1.5% in 2005 to 17.7% in 2017) and the transport sector, which 
grew from 12.6% in 2005 to 21.9% in 2017. We can see the plots in Fig 4. 
 
Figure 4: Share of Agriculture, Metals, and Transport Sectors as a percentage of Total 
Chinese OFDI from 2005 to 2017 
The data is indicative of a broader underlying trend. The shift away from metal 
industry and the decline in share of investments in the energy sector may possibly hint at a 
move away from resource extraction activities. This change in investment pattern is 
symptomatic of the strategic shift in investment preferences. 
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GEOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS 
In addition to the sector analysis, another major indicator of the change in Chinese 
OFDI pattern is the changing destination of investment. This is relevant to the testing of 
our hypothesis as a change in destination countries will directly affect the political risks 
that the investments are exposed to since political risks are associated with the country. A 
shift in Chinese investments from a country with high political risks to a country with low 
risks would make the investments safer. We can observe distinct patterns in Chinese 
investments depending upon the location of the investment. Studying Chinese investments 
patterns in Africa, Asia, and Europe reveals interesting insights. 
There is extensive literature on Chinese investments in Africa. Ayadele and Sotola 
(2014) and Mourao (2017) analyze the motivation behind Chinese investments in Africa. 
Although Chinese investment in Africa has gone up in absolute numbers, as a relative share 
of total Chinese outward investment, it has declined significantly vis-à-vis other 
geographical regions. Africa’s share in Chinese OFDI peaked at 9.8% in 2008 and has 
dropped to 0.3% in 2010 (Kobylinski 2012). Kobylinski (2012) states that most of the 
Chinese investors, such as Sinopec, Sinosteel, China nonferrous, that invested heavily in 
China between 2005 and 2008 did not have any major investment in Africa in 2011. The 
majority of the Chinese SOEs are engaged in extraction activities and are attracted to 
population size and forest cover (Yodel and Sotala (2014); and Mourao (2017)). Using a 
stochastic model, Mourao (2017) analyzed the determinants of Chinese OFDI in 48 African 
countries in the period between 2003 and 2010 and found that population size and forest 
cover are significant factors. 
In contrast, China’s investments in Asia have seen significant growth since the 
1990s. OFDI to Asia went up from 27.87% in the 1990s to 55.81% of total Chinese OFDI 
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in 2004 (Buckley, Cross, Tan, and Voss, 2008). Even within Asia, the biggest recipient 
were countries in South and South-East Asia, where the Chinese OFDI went up from 
15.42% in 1990s to 53.38% in 2004 (Buckley, Cross, Tan, and Voss 2008). As argued by 
the authors, the principal reason for this increase in Chinese investments in South and 
South-East Asia was geographic proximity to China (Buckley, Cross, Tan, and Voss 2008). 
Another aspect of the changing nature of Chinese investments that has attracted 
attention only recently is the increasing investments in Europe. From being an insignificant 
player in Europe in 2009 in terms of investments (Nicolas 2009), Chinese investments in 
Europe stands at around $318 billion in 2018 (Tartar, Rojanasakul, and Diamond 2018). 
SOEs account for a majority of this investment, with the largest investor – Chinese National 
Chemical Corp investing $58.2 billion over the past decade (Tartar, Rojanasakul, and 
Diamond 2018). 
Africa and Europe offer two contrasting patterns of Chinese investments. Chinese 
investments in Europe rose significantly after 2009, whereas Chinese investments in Africa 
as a percentage of its total outward investment dropped drastically after 2008. In both cases, 
the majority of the investors were Chinese State-Owned Enterprises. Thus, this indicates a 
clear change in Chinese foreign investment pattern. 
The change in the relative proportion of Chinese OFDI in Africa, Europe, and Asia 
affects the empirical relationship between Chinese OFDI and host country political risk, 
since the risk profile of countries in Asia and Europe is notably better than the risk profile 




Chapter 6: Chinese Investments Moving to Safer Shores 
In this chapter, I perform a preliminary analysis and visualize the trends in the risk 
index of Chinese investments in order to test support for either of the stated hypotheses. 
The empirical data shows that Chinese investments have historically been more 
acceptant of political risk when compared to investments by firms from other developed 
nations. This is noted by (Buckley, Cross, Tan, & Voss, 2008), when they observe the 
growing Chinese investments in Africa in the 1990s and early 2000s. As an example, we 
can look at the comparison between risk indices for Chinese and American FDI (Fig 5).  
The average risk index is a mean of the risk index weighted by investments. The 
average risk index of Chinese investments is formulated as follows:  
 
𝑅𝑡 =  ∑




 Where, Rt = Average Risk index of a dollar of Chinese Investment in year t. Ii,t = 
Chinese investment in country i in year t. Ri,t = Political Risk Index of country i in year t. 
It = Total Chinese outward Investment in year t. 
We can see that the political risk index for Chinese investments has been lower than 
the risk index for American investments for the years from 2005-2017, indicating that the 
political risk associated with Chinese investments is higher than the political risk associated 
with US investments for the same period.  
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Figure 5: Comparison between Risk Indices of Chinese and US FDI. 
 
Figure 6: Trends in Chinese Average Risk Index compared to World Risk Index 
However, a preliminary analysis - wherein I track the average risk index of Chinese 
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investments have become progressively safer, vis-à-vis prior investments, on a per-dollar 
basis (with regards to the political risk associated with them) in the period 2013 – 2017 
after the Belt and Road Initiative was announced. The average risk index of Chinese 
investments has been the highest in 2017, indicating that, on average, the investments have 
been the safest in terms of their exposure to political risk. However, this does not imply 
that individual projects are not subject to political risks.  
Additionally, I plot the global risk index, shown by the red line, on this graph in 
order to compare its trajectory with that of the risk index of Chinese investment. We can 
see in Fig.6, that after 2013, the risk index for Chinese investment is not only greater than 
global average, but the difference between the two is increasing, indicating that Chinese 
investments, on an average, face lower political risks than the global trends. This is 
interesting considering that the graph for the World Risk Index is going down , suggesting 
that on an average, the political risk in the world is increasing. 
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Chapter 7: Empirical Model 
The following section lays down the variables and the empirical model that I 
employ to test my null and counter hypothesis. 
VARIABLES 
I use the following variables to build my model: 
• Hypothesis Variable: The Risk index of a country in a given year. I obtain the data 
for this variable from the ICRG dataset. 
• Dependent Variable: The amount of Chinese OFDI to a country in a given year. 
This is taken from the CGIT dataset. 
In addition, in line with previous studies on Chinese OFDI and Political Risks by 
Buckley, Clegg, et al. (2007), and Goswami and Haider (2014), I employ the following 
control variables in my statistical analysis: 
• Control Variable 1: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of a country in a given year. 
This is used to control for the absolute size of the host country market. I source this 
data from the World Bank dataset on GDP.6 
• Control Variable 2: Gross Domestic Product per Capita (GDP per cap) of a country 
in a given year. This variable controls the relative size of the host country market. 
This is sourced from the World Bank dataset on GDP per capita.7 
In addition to the control variables, I use country fixed effects to account for any 
country specific attribute. This is consistent with the previous studies by Busse and Hefeker 





I merge the Chinese investment data (CGIT), the country risk data (IRCG), the 
GDP data, and the GDP per Capita data for countries for the period 2005-2017. The merged 
dataset contains Chinese investments in 117 countries, their corresponding risks, GDP, and 
GDP per Capita. We get a large N small T panel dataset. 
EMPIRICAL MODEL 
In order to check my hypotheses, I use the following log-linear model: 
  ln (Y’it ) = β0 + β1 ∙ ln(Riskit) + α ∙ Xit + µi + εit       (1) 
Where,   Y’it = Yit + 0.01 
 
Riskit is the hypothesis variable and Yit denotes the Chinese outward foreign direct 
investment to country i in year t. I perform this transformation as the panel data has zeroes 
for certain values. I add 0.01 to get valid results when I do a natural log transformation of 
the data. I choose 0.01, as that is a small value that will allow me to do the log 
transformation without introducing a bias to the estimators. 
X denotes the vector of control variables. I use GDP and GDP per capita to control 
for the absolute and relative market size respectively. The variable µi denotes country fixed 
effects. 
Considering our control variables, Eq. 1 can be written as follows: 
ln (Y’it ) = β0 + β1 ∙ ln(Riskit) + α1 ∙ ln(GDP) + α2 ∙ ln(GDP/cap) + µi + εit        (2) 
In order to check for the effects of the control variables, I run the model without 
control variables. The modified model is as follows: 
ln (Y’it ) = β0 + β1 ∙ ln(Riskit) + µi + εit            (3) 
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This paper studies the association between Chinese OFDI and country risks before 
and after the Belt and Road Initiative. I run two regressions, one for the period before the 
Belt and Road Initiative (2005-2012) and the other for years after the initiative was 
announced (2013-2017). I then compare the correlation coefficient from the two 
regressions. 
I apply OLS with fixed-effect model (FE) to estimate the two equations. I also 
considered the regular OLS regression (results attached in Appendix Table 3A); however, 
regular OLS regression fails to capture the heterogeneity across countries.  
The panel data setting combines both cross-sectional and time series data. The cross 
sectional units (countries) may show heteroskedasticity (Baltagi, Jung and Song 2010). The 
Breusch pagan test (Appendix Table 1A) confirms the existence of heteroskedasticity in 
the data. In addition to this, the data will also have a serial correlation. Since firms make 
investment decisions over multiple years, the amount invested in a country will depend 
upon the amount invested in previous years. I resolve this issue by using the Arellano 
method to derive robust standard errors These are clustered by group (in this case, country) 
and are designed specifically for Large N Small T (~less than 30) panel setting (Arellano 
1987). This method is basically an extension of White standard errors (White 1984), 
applied to a fixed effect setting. and resolves both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
(Millo 2017).  
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Chapter 8: Results 
Table 1 presents the results of the statistical analysis with clustered standard errors. 
The table shows the OLS with Fixed Effects estimate for the association between the 
cumulative political risk index of a country and the Chinese OFDI for the two models with 
and without control variables. The hypothesis variable “Risk” has a negative impact on 
Chinese outward investment to a country in the period after 2013 for both the models and 
is statistically significant at 5%. This confirms my counter hypothesis that after 2013, the 
relationship between Chinese OFDI and host country political risk is negative. 
 
  
Pre 2013 Post 2013 Pre 2013 Post 2013 





1 2 3 4 
ln (Risk) 11.904 -16.144 2.644 -16.975 
  (-4.082)** (-5.087)** (4.630) (7.414)* 
ln(GDP)     4.75 3.06 
      (4.384) (8.223) 
ln(GDP/Capita)     0.237 -2.653 
      (4.900) (7.998) 
Country Fixed 
Effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Adj R-sq 0.3043 0.5042 0.3656 0.4936 
n 116 115 116 115 
T   2-8 5 2-8 5 
N 921 575 921 575 
** 0.01, * 0.05, ‘ 0.1 
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Table 1: Results for correlation between Chinese OFDI and cumulative risk (OLS with 
Fixed Effects) 
The coefficient for Political Risk for Pre 2013 analysis is statistically significant at 
1% for the model without control variable. However, the coefficient is not significant when 
I run the model with control variables. More importantly, the correlation in both the cases 
for the pre-2013 period, is non-negative. This result is in line with previous studies by 
Buckley, Clegg, et al. (2007); Kolstad and Wiig (2012); and Cheung and Qian (2009) that 
found either no correlation or a positive one between Chinese OFDI and host country 
political risk. This positive association between Chinese OFDI and rising host country 
political risk confounded researchers, as it was not consistent with the conventional 
wisdom.  
I employed the OLS estimator with fixed effects to perform the statistical analysis. 
The coefficients estimated by the FE model will have a Nickell Bias. However, this bias is 
always in the downward direction (Nickell 1981). This implies that the coefficients are a 
conservative estimate. This actually works in my favor because even the most conservative 
estimate demonstrates a reversal in correlation, which supports my counter hypothesis that 
the correlation between Chinese OFDI and host country political risk becomes negative 
after 2013. 
While selecting the model, I had to decide between Fixed Effects and Random 
Effects (Snijders 2005). I use a large N small T panel dataset where T is sufficiently small. 
The FE model is more convincing theoretically than a RE model unless the individual 
specific effect is an unrelated effect. However, we are unable to confirm this statistically. 
The standard test to select between the Fixed effect and the Random effect model is the 
Hausman test (Green 2008). The results of the Hausman test, shown in Appendix Table 
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2A, indicate that we may use the fixed effect model for our analysis. However, we must 
exercise caution while interpreting the results. Hausman test is valid only under the 
conditions of homoskedasticity (Baltagi, Bresson, and Pirotte 2003). Our data clearly has 
heteroskedasticity, as proven by the Breutsch- Pagan test (results in Appendix Table 1A). 
Hence, we cannot use the Hausman test to select between the Fixed Effect and Random 
Effect model. This should not be an issue though because the Fixed Effect model is more 
strenuous than a Random Effect model. 
The country fixed effects model allows me to account for country specific 
attributes, other than my dependent and control variables, that may change over time within 
a country. Thus, the OLS with fixed effects estimator for risk will tell me the correlation 
between a country’s political risk and the Chinese OFDI it receives holding constant the 
average effect of the country. 
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Chapter 9: Discussion 
The results confirm a statistically significant change in Chinese foreign investments 
post-2013, confirming my counter-hypothesis. This coincides directly with the launch of 
the Belt and Road Initiative, suggesting that Chinese OFDI behavior changed under the 
BRI and became less, not more, acceptant of political risk in host countries. This 
relationship between Chinese OFDI and political risk after the launch of the BRI, as 
opposed to before, follows the conventional idea about political stability attracting higher 
FDI (Busse and Hefeker (2007); Goswami and Haider (2014); and Krifa-Schneider & 
Matei (2010)). Post 2013, contrary to some of the contemporary scholarship raising alarms 
(Hurley, Morris, and Portelence (2019); Dave and Kobayashi (2018); and Johnston 
(2019)), Chinese firms are behaving much like standard non-Chinese firms when it comes 
to considering political risks in their investment decisions, and the association is contrary 
to that in the period before 2013, when Chinese OFDI flowed into countries with higher 
political risks (Buckley, et al. (2007); Kolstad and Wiig (2012)).  
While it is beyond the scope of this thesis to test the following claims, I hypothesize 
that this behavior can be explained by a combination of the following factors, each 
discussed below: greater participation of Chinese publicly listed firms; realization of the 
Ownership (O), Location (L), and Internalization (I) – OLI advantages by Chinese SOEs, 
and a hedging strategy. 
TYPE OF FIRMS - SOE VS PUBLIC 
The type of firms conducting OFDI may lead to a change in investment behavior.  
The first, and the largest (in terms of FDI), companies to “go global” (engage in OFDI) 
were Chinese State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). Chinese SOEs, such as Sinopec, China 
 36 
National Petroleum Corp, China Minmetals, have unique incentive structure and operate 
under constraints different from that of a public listed firm (Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008). 
They ascribed this difference to their ownership structures and their relationship with the 
government of China. This leads to the SBC syndrome in Chinese SOEs. As Kornai, 
Maskin and Roland (2003) explain, SBC syndrome is when firms can count on surviving 
even when they are loss-making. This happens when firms expect to be bailed out by other 
organizations, which are usually the government or any other state agency (Maskin and 
Roland 2003). Additionally, Chinese SOEs enjoy a monopoly status in their sectors, 
sanctioned by the government (Morck, Yeung and Zhao 2008). Unlike a standard firm, 
Chinese SOEs do not have to compete with other Chinese firms, an advantage that they 
enjoy over a standard firm when SOEs conduct foreign direct investments. Thus, Chinese 
SOEs might not be motivated by profit maximization the same way as a standard firm is, 
and can take on additional risk. As previously discussed, this moral hazard problem 
emerges from pervasive soft budget constraints (Kornai, Maskin, & Roland, 2003), 
forsaking long-term strategic thinking. The Chinese government provides guarantees to 
SOEs, either explicitly through government-backed insurance or implicitly through 
Chinese development bank financing (Russel and Berger 2019). Hence, Chinese SOEs 
were more likely to invest in countries with higher political risk ((Buckley, Clegg, et al. 
(2007); Buckley, Cross, et al. (2008); and Kolstad and Wiig (2012)), because the risk will 
be transferred to the supporting organization, responsible for bailing the SOE out in case 
of a financial trouble. If the investment failed, the SOEs were confident they would be 
bailed out by the government (Cull and Xu (2000); Kornai, Maskin, and Roland (2003); 
and Dewatripont and Maskin (1995). 
However, Chinese private firms, such as Lenovo and Haier, have completely 
different attributes. They do not enjoy any of the advantages of domestic monopoly and 
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access to capital enjoyed by their state-owned counterparts; a handicap they overcome by 
being more efficient in deploying their limited capital (Antsey 2019). As a result, Chinese 
private firms are likely to be more sensitive to the risks and invest in countries with lower 
political risk. The private share of Chinese outward investments has grown tremendously 
since the announcement of BRI, rising from 14% before 2013 to over 50% in 2016; 
exceeding the investments by State (Scissors 2016). This surge of private investments post 
2013 in countries with lower political risks would explain the negative correlation between 
Chinese OFDI and host country political risk. One way to test this empirically is to separate 
the Chinese OFDI to countries by the type of firm. Empirically, this would involve adding 
a dummy variable for firm type. That should tell us the risk sensitivity of Chinese SOE vis-
à-vis their private counterparts. 
OWNERSHIP, LOCATION, AND INTERNALIZATION (OLI) ADVANTAGE 
The relationship between Chinese firms’ political risk acceptance and OFDI 
behavior may also be understood through the framework provided by internalization 
theory, and the OLI theory (Dunning 1980)). According to the theory, firms will invest in 
foreign markets only if the firm enjoys Ownership (O), Location (L), and Internalization 
(I) advantages in that market. Over the years, Chinese firms, including SOEs, have 
positioned themselves such that they can leverage the OLI advantages:  
• Ownership (O): Chinese firms have access to cheap capital (Ma & Andrews-
Speed, 2006). This gives them a competitive edge over firms from developed 
economies, especially in sectors where the importance of brand values is 
diminishing but has not disappeared (Nicolas 2009). This competitive edge 
translates into “ownership advantage” and allows Chinese firms to compete in 
developed markets. 
 38 
• Location (L): Since the Belt and Road Initiative has set up some ambitious goals, 
Chinese firms are aggressively looking to acquire more advanced technologies. The 
‘Made in China 2025’ identifies key sectors for technological advancements – 
Information Technology, high-end robots, Aerospace equipment, and advanced 
materials (“Made in China 2025” 2015). Consequently, Chinese firms would invest 
in countries with higher technological innovation levels, which in turn, implies 
investing in politically stable countries, since the level of technological innovation 
in a country is positively correlated with political stability in that country (Allard, 
Martinez, & Williams, 2012). 
• Internalization (I): The internalization advantage for Chinese OFDI post the BRI 
is tied to the Location advantage with respect to access to technology. Investing in 
developed economies will allow the Chinese firms to internalize the advanced 
technology typically found in these countries.  
The realization of the OLI advantages paved the way for Chinese firms’ entry into 
developed economies, where the investments are exposed to lower political risks, when the 
BRI was announced. For example, Chinese investments to Italy grew tremendously after 
the BRI, and Italy ultimately joined the initiative, becoming the first major European 
country to do so (Ellyatt 2019). 
HEDGING 
The final explanation could be strategic hedging. China’s outstanding claims to 
developing countries exceed those of all Paris club creditors combined (Morris 2019). 
China is lending to some high-risk countries while at the same time, investing in politically 
stable developed economies. This could be a way for China to hedge against a possible 
debt crisis. The research design for testing the “Hedging” argument would involve studying 
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the debt implications of Chinese OFDI in detail and setting the research in the broader geo-






Chapter 10: Conclusions and Future Work 
This report analyzes the impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) on the 
association between Chinese outward foreign direct investment and host country political 
risk over the period 2005-2017. Past studies have explored the political determinants of 
Chinese OFDI, however, they have not re-examined the relationship with more recent data 
that coincides with the launch of the BRI.  Despite this lack of empirical research, there 
has been abundant speculation that the BRI would dramatically increase risky Chinese 
OFDI and, in so doing, exacerbate problems of excessive debt burdens and defaults in 
already unstable countries (Dave and Kobayashi (2018); Hurley, Morris, & Portelence 
(2019); and Johnston (2019)). This research questions these claims by statistically 
analyzing the relationship between Chinese investments and political risk, data for Chinese 
OFDI from the American Enterprise Institute and ICRG country risk data from PRS that 
contributed to a data-frame for 117 countries, each with 13 risk attributes.  
The announcement of BRI ensued a prominent shift in the investment pattern of 
Chinese investors. A longitudinal analysis of Chinese investments reveals a change in 
investment pattern across sectors as well as countries indicating a move towards 
destinations with lower political risks. In this way, the empirical evidence using data from 
2005-2017 contradicts the null hypothesis: the correlation between Chinese OFDI and host 
country political risk is negative after the announcement of the Belt and Road Initiative. 
And while this does not eliminate the possible of consequences such as debt overhangs and 
defaults, it does give us pause to rethink some of the more alarming assertations out there 
in the popular press.  
In order to test my hypothesis empirically, I build a log-linear regression model. I 
use the OLS method with Fixed Effects to derive the estimators. The statistical analysis 
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confirms my counter-hypothesis, which establishes the change in investment pattern of 
Chinese firms and indicates that Chinese OFDI post 2013 is more sensitive to political risks 
in host country. 
Additionally, in this paper, I build upon the results of the statistical analysis, 
expounding upon the reasons for the observed change. I delineate the possible reasons for 
this change, hypothesizing three factors that might be causing the change in investment 
pattern – a) a growing participation of Chinese private firms in outward investments, b) 
realization of OLI advantages, and c) a broader hedging strategy to protect the Chinese 
investments from a potential debt crisis. 
I use aggregated Chinese investment data in this research.  A shortcoming of this 
approach is that it does not allow me to analyze the possible explanations for the observed 
results.  A firm level analysis of the investments and the risk associated with each of those 
investments will allow me to distinguish between investments by Chinese SOEs and public 
listed firms and develop more insights about the behavior of Chinese firms. That would 
enable me to ascertain the reasons for the observed results. 
This report paves the way for future research that could explain the behavior of 
Chinese firms. Future work would involve investigating the factors that influence a Chinese 
firms’ FDI decision and reveal some insights about the behavior of Chinese firms post BRI. 
While a lot of research has been done to study the rationale behind Chinese SOEs’ 
investment decisions (Morck, Yeung and Zhao (2008); and Child and Rodrigues (2005); 
Cull and Xu (2000)), there is still limited literature on the OFDI behavior Chinese private 
firms in the contemporary era, despite the extensive attention devoted to Chinese OFDI in 
the popular press and gray literature. A comparative study of the Chinese private firms and 
SOEs would reveal insights about the difference in risk perceptions, budget constraints, 
and how the firms conducts business in foreign markets. While an empirical study will 
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reveal the broad trends, a qualitative investigation, involving interviews with the top 
managers of private firms, similar to the study by (Peng M. (1997); and Peng and Harwit 
(1996)) should fill the gap in the current literature. In addition to this, the implication of 
Chinese investment on global debt merits an investigation.   
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Appendix 
COMPONENTS OF POLITICAL RISK INDEX (PRS GROUP) 
The four major components of the political risk index (PRS Group) are Government 
Stability, Socio-economic conditions, Investments Profile, and Conflict. 
Government stability denotes the government's ability to carry out its programs and 
its ability to stay in power. A stable government would have popular support and will be 
able to provide a safer environment for foreign investments.  
Socio-economic conditions, such as poverty, unemployment, and consumer 
confidence assess the socioeconomic pressures in a society that can fuel social 
dissatisfaction.  
The Investment Profile indicator measures the risks that are specific to investments. 
These risks could be payment delays or contract viability.  
The conflict components (Internal and External) measure the risk to the country 
due to an armed conflict. An armed conflict would adversely affect the governance 
capabilities of the country and pose a risk to the investments in that country.  
These are the major components of political risks and are further divided into sub-
components. The other components of political risks are more specific, and they measure 
explicit political components such as law and order, corruption, bureaucratic quality, or 





BREUTSCH PAGAN TEST 
  p-Value 
(H0 – Homoskedasticity 
exists) 
Model (1) – Pre 2013 
without Control variables 
0.000000400 
Model (2) - Post 2013 
without Control variables 
0.000000342 
Model (3) - Pre 2013 with 
Control variables 
0.000173600 
Model (4) - Post 2013 with 
Control variables 
0.000000745 




(H0 – preferred model is 
Random Effects) 
























Pre 2013 Post 2013 





1 2 3 4 
ln (Risk) 1.58 -0.80 2.13 -0.66 
  (0.07)’ 0.494 (0.012)* (0.584) 
ln(GDP)     1.43 1.93 
      (0.0002)*** (0.0002)*** 
ln(GDP/Capita)     -0.96 -1.12 
      (0.0002)*** (0.0006)*** 
Country Fixed 
Effects 
No No No No 
 Adj R-sq 0.00262 0.00090 0.13800 0.23700 
N 921 575 921 575 
*** 0.001, ** 0.01, * 0.05, ‘ 0.1 
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